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Abstract 
The comparative analysis of air quality control policies provides an 
interesting field for studies of comparative policy analysis including pro- 
gram formulation and implementation processes. In European countries, 
the problem is comparable, whereas implementation structures, programs 
and policy impacts vary to  a considerable extent. Analysis testing possi- 
bilities and constraints of air control policies under varying conditions are 
likely to  contribute to  a further development of a theory of policy analy- 
sis. This paper presents the analytical framework applied in a continuing 
empirical study explaining program formulation and implementation pro- 
cesses with respect to  the different actors involved. Concrete emitter 
behavior can be explained by interaction processes at the very local level, 
by program elements of national legislation, and by structural constraints 
under which such programs are produced. 
Resume 
L'analyse comparative des politiques de contrale de la qualitk de l'air 
ouvre un nouveau champ d'analyse qui comprend la formulation de pro- 
grammes et les processus de mise en ceuvre. En Europe, la situation est 
comparable d'un pays a l'autre, tandis que les structures pour la mise en 
euvre ,  les impacts des programmes et de la politique varient considkrable- 
ment. Les possibilitks de tester l'analyse et les contraintes des politiques 
de contr6le de l'air dans des conditions variables contribuent au dCvelop- 
pement ultkrieur de la thCorie de l'analyse des politiques. L'article prksente 
le cadre d'analyse d'une recherche empirique encore en cours : il explique 
a la fois la formulation des programmes et les processus de mise en euvre  
a la lumiere de leur sklectivitk qui favorise ou dkfavorise les acteurs qui sont 
impliquks. Le comportement concret d'kmission est expliquC par des pro- 
cessus d'interaction a un niveau tres local, des elements de programme des 
1Cgislations nationales ainsi que des contraintes structurales par lesquelles 
ces programmes sont produits. 
In most Western European countries systematic air quality control 
policies were introduced in the early seventies; hitherto mostly very gen- 
eral parliamentary acts were concretized by administrative decrees or 
guidelines. During the first half of the decade air quality improved rapidly; 
after the oil crisis of 1 973/ 74, however, ambient air quality measurement 
data showed a considerable degree of stabilization; towards the end of the 
seventies, signs of deterioration in most metropolitan areas and - more 
significant - in middle range subcenters were evident. A comparison of 
these data with air quality control legislation leads to  the conviction that 
the programmatic promises of the early seventies have not been realized 
everywhere to the same extent2. Social science research interested in an 
improvement of the implementation of air quality control programs has 
to  ask for the possible reasons for such different impacts of environmental 
policies in different regions and countries. Implementation activities are 
normally carried out by regional agencies. In most European countries 
these agencies can be considered as the core implementation actors. They 
work in cooperation with local authorities and under some form of (more 
or less close) supervision by different national agencies. 
Referring to  classical implementation theory (e.g. Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973 ; Gross, Giacquinta & Bernstein, 197 1 ), we assumed that 
the quality of implementation activities especially depends on the stmc- 
ture of the national and/or regional program itself, specific features of the 
implementingadministrative units and on the constellation o f  actors with- 
in their jurisdiction (implementation field). In order to control the influ- 
ence of these three variables two to four different local implementation 
areas (LIA) have been chosen within selected regions (regional implemen- 
tation system = RIS) keeping the precisely defined emitter structure as 
constant as possible. This selection makes it possible to  compare activities 
of different implementation systems both within a given country and 
between the different countries under investigation. 
The "International Comparative Analysis of Program Formulation 
and Implementation of SO2 Control Policies in Seven EC Countries and 
Switzerland-3 presented here examines the management of air quality (SO,) 
This contribution is based on "Analytical Framework and Research Guidelines for the 
National Research Teams" by Peter Knoepfel, Helmut Weidner and Kenneth Hanf. It also 
includes some research notes written in connection with the International Comparative 
Analysis of Program Formulation and Implementation in SO, Air Pollution Control Policies 
in EC Countries and Switzerland, a research project of IIES, mutually funded by the German 
Research Foundation and Foundation Volkswagenwerk. It is a shortened and modified ver- 
sion of my contribution to  the Colloquium at  Lausanne. I would like to  thank Dagmar 
Kollande, IIES, for some valuable suggestions in editing this article. 
Such differences can be found in the FRG (Munich vs. Berlin), U.K. (Greater London vs. 
Liveroool). France (Paris vs. Lille). Italy (Rome. Bolognavs. Turin). Cf. Knoepfel & Weidner, 
, , .. . 
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- 
3Cf. P. Knoepfel; H. Weidner & K. Hanf : "Analytical Framework and Research Guidelines 
for the National Research Teams" (Manuscript, Berlin, June 1980). This project is mutually 
funded by the German Research Foundation and the Foundation Volkswagenwerk. 
over the last ten years; it attempts to  find out the most important factors 
responsible for the improvement or  deterioration of ambient air quality 
in comparable areas (LIAs) by specifically analyzing activities of environ- 
mental agencies using a common framework, which would make it poss- 
ible to  compare different policies within different various countries. Refer- 
ring both to the German "polit-economic theory" (e.g. Harbermas, 1973; 
Offe, 1973; Knoepfel & Weidner, 1978) and some American analysts (Bar- 
dach, 1977; Downing & Brady, 1978; van Meter & van Horn, 1975; Downing, 
1979), environmental quality policy can be considered as a "policy game" 
in which interest-motivated actors participate by employing different 
strategies on different levels. Policy outputs such as implementation activ- 
ities and programs are seen as results of interaction processes amongst 
actors under predetermined constraints set by the rules of the game. Using 
this analytical concept, it is necessary to  include in implementation analy- 
sis an assessment of interest recognition patterns within the program for- 
mulation process itself. Specific actors frequently play a multiple game, 
acting at the same time on both the local implementation and the national 
program formulation levels. Furthermore, implementation analysis must 
include those policy processes in which specific constraints of interaction 
processes as such are created and modified. Actors may seek to  change 
these rules of the game in order to  secure their interests in any concrete 
case. 
The ultimate dependent variable of such an analysis is the trend o f  air 
quality in the selected local implementation areas as indicated by measure- 
ment data. In European countries, climatic and topographic conditions 
can be treated as constant factors as well as the transboundary SO, imports 
over ten years which partially influence these quality trends (Barnes &Met, 
1978). Therefore, our secondary dependent variable is the actual develop- 
ment of SO, emissions shaped by the behavior o f  the main emitters within 
a given LIA immediately affecting air quality in that area. On the basis of 
SO, emission data we attempted to  determine the extent to  which emitter 
behavior depends on implementation activities of environmental agencies. 
It is obviously not shaped exclusively by environmental policy activities. 
On the contrary, there are important "intervening variables" affecting 
emission activities although not directly related to  environmental policy. 
As in the case of locational and even sociostructural variables, it is necess- 
ary t o  include the main intervening variables in the analysis. Nevertheless, 
some reduced correlation between environmental implementation activi- 
ties (indicated primarily by administrative outputs) and emitter behavior 
has been found. On the basis of comprehensive output analysis our research 
investigated all interaction processes between agencies, individual emitters 
and any other actors leading to  related outputs. Assuming that these inter- 
action processes are partially determined by different kinds of program- 
matic constraints, and by the relative power of involved actor groups and 
emitters, the project tried to  identify the weight of these different el- 
ements determining specific interest recognition patterns found in the 
individual LIAs. For that purpose the empirical analysis proceeded from 
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the bottom (LIA) to  the top (national program formulation) in order to 
reconstruct crucial elements of the relevant environmental policy game. 
This article tries to  reassume the basic elements of our framework 
and to  outline the crucial analytical dimensions developed for the empiri- 
cal investigations realized by national research teams in cooperation with 
the central team in Berlin4. It is not intended to report on the results of 
the investigations although they are available at the moment. Their con- 
siderable quality, however, shows that by using this conceptual framework 
it is possible trace empirically crucial aspects of program formulation and 
implementation processes in regulative environmental policies in a com- 
parative way5 . 
2. Conceptual framework 
2.1. Overview 
The starting point for the analysis within each o f  the approximately 
70 LIAs from 20 Regional Implementation Systems in eight European 
countries lies in the changes of actual ambient air quality (outcome) to  be 
related to changes in the behavior of relevant emitter groups over time 
(impact). Secondly, our research has tried systematically to identify the 
motivations of emitters to either change or maintain their behavior in 
order to  determine the extent to which emitter behavior is influenced by 
environmental policy activities. Finally, our research has attempted to 
account successively for these policy impacts by examining the effects of 
different policy outputs on emission-relevant emitter behavior, the sets 
of interaction through which these outputs are generated, and the struc- 
ture of national control programs conceived in a very broad sense. For 
that purpose, it was necessary to establish, from the very beginning, a broad 
analysis of actors on the national, regional and local levels. The sequence 
in which the following variables are presented corresponds t o  the various 
successive steps of the research. 
The different groups of independent variables are presented as differ- 
ent layers of a complex set of interrelationships among actors on different 
levels, through which the interest position of these actors involved in pro- 
gram formulation and implementation processes are asserted. These in- 
terests are reflected at first in consolidated political-administrative struc- 
tures and procedures themselves (rules of the game), in the specific con- 
tents and structures of concrete policy programs, and, in concrete interac- 
tion processes concerned with implementation. In order to  prevent the 
danger of "top-down-perspectives" excluding important but program- 
matically not anticipated processes, it was decided to  begin with the analy- 
4Compcsed of Helmut Weidner, Kenneth Hanf and the author. The countries involved are : 
Italy, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, U.K. and Switzerland. 
5 A  reassumption of the final reports will be made in the final comparative study established 
by Helmut Weidner and the author (vol. 2) in 1983. Furthermore, the national reports will 
serve as the basis for a book to be published in each country of the project in 1982 in the 
respective native languages. 
70
 
80
 
Am
bi
en
t 
Em
itt
er
 
C
-- 
LI
 A 
Us
e 
po
l. 
pu
t g
en
e-
 
+
-
-
-
 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
M
ar
ke
t 
Fi
el
d-
 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
4
 -
 -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
 
-
 
So
cia
l 
O
ut
co
m
e 
Im
pa
ct
 
im
pl
.fi
el
d In
de
pe
nd
en
t V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 V
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Fi
g.
 1
. 
Iil
te
rn
at
io
na
l c
o
m
pa
ra
tiv
e a
n
al
ys
is 
o
f p
ro
gr
am
 f
or
m
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
o
f S
O,
 c
o
n
tr
ol
 po
lic
ie
s 
in
 s
ev
en
 E
C 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s a
n
d 
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
. 
Sc
he
m
at
ic
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
o
f t
he
 re
se
ar
ch
 d
es
ig
n 
w
ith
 re
sp
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 g
ro
up
s 
o
f v
ar
ia
bl
es
. 
292 1 Peter Knoepfel I 
sis of implementation activities in the different LIAs, then move back 
towards the examination of program formulation processes on the national 
level. The chart (Fig. 1) illustrates the research design with respect to  the 
different groups of variables listed below. 
2.1 . l .  Dependent variables 
- The actual level of SO2 concentration in the ambient air and its 
change over time within each LIA ("outcome"); 
- the actual behavior of the main emitter groups in the LIA and its 
change over time ("impact"); 
- the environmental policy implementation activities which partially 
affect emitter behavior in each LIA ("outputs"). 
2.1.2. Independent variables 
Layer I : the interaction process between the environmental agency, 
emitters and local, regional or national actor groups involved in implemen- 
tation activities through which outputs are generated, explaining their 
selectivity and their content. 
Layer 2 : The relative power o f  actors involved, the administrative 
implementation structures within the LIA and implementation-relevant 
program elements : the interaction process is viewed as the result of the 
actions of the various actor groups operating in the implementation area 
according to the rules of the game prestucturing certain patterns of interest 
recognition reflected in the administrative program, as well as the result 
of concrete administrative structures and possible interventions from 
"above". 
Layer 3 : Structural and procedural feactures in program formulation 
processes on the national level : as an explanation of the pattern of interest 
recognition found in the implementation processes, program formulation 
processes are to be investigated in order to  enable the explanation of result- 
ing program elements. 
Layer 4 : Locational variables : such context dimensions changing over 
time may either positively or negatively affect the interest position and 
relative influence of actor groups in implementation and program formu- 
lation processes independent of concrete environmental policy issues. 
Layer 5 : System-structural "variables": these basic societal power 
relations work constantly in favor or against the power positions of actors 
involved in program formulation and implementation processes indepen- 
dent of limited changes of locational variables over time. 
2.1.3. Intervening variables : 
- energy policy outputs and their background; 
- regional planning outputs; 
- macro- and regional economic policy outputs; 
- market mechanisms; 
- direct social control over emitters by the public. 
I lrnplernentatlon or alr quality Improvement rrograrns 
2.2. The dependent variables - determining the net effects o f  
environmental policy 
Ambient air quality trends (outcome) are reported by measurement 
data available for all LIAs under investigation. This situation enables im- 
plementation and evaluation research in quite a unique way. The level of 
pollution and its changes over time can be considered as a direct function 
of the volume of emissions and itsdispersion conditions (height of chimney 
stacks) by keeping constant climatic and topographic conditions as well 
as SO, imports into the area. Emitter behavior is indicated by the total 
volume of SO, per LIA; its changes over time combined with the related 
dispersion conditions calculated in terms of the average height of stacks 
for the different main emitter groups over time are investigated by means 
of individual interviews. A comparison of ambient air quality data with 
the total amount of SO, emissions and dispersion conditions has brought 
a direct correlation, at least for the early seventies, when almost every- 
where in Europe the sulphur content of fuels was reduced. 
Determining a linkage between emitter behavior and environmental 
policy activities has been more difficult. In order to  estimate an approxi- 
mative overall effect of policy activities a "net emission effect" of the 
development within the LIAs was calculated by estimating how the total 
volume of emissions would have developed since 1970, according to  actual 
economic development if the kinds of fuel consumed, their sulphur con- 
tent, the emission factors and the heights of stacks would have remained 
the same during the last years. The SO, amount calculated in this way has 
then been compared to  the actual emissions of 1979. The difference be- 
tween extrapolated and actual figures has been interpreted as the "net 
emission effect of development". However, this figure cannot be considered 
as the net effect of environmental policy, since it largely reflects conse- 
quences of either measures in other policy areas, changing conditions on 
the fuel supply market, or developments in social control exerted by those 
affected by pollution ("intervening variables"). 
In order to determine the actual net effect o f  environmental policy 
these factors have to  be excluded. For this purpose, the different motives 
of the main emitters have been studied : their change of behavior by using 
alternative fuels, introducing new abatement technologies, closing down 
their plants or building new ones and changing their stacks. Having isolated 
emitter behavior owing to  environmental policy outputs the research fo- 
cused upon all relevant output files in environmental agencies in order 
to  explain the behavior of industrial and domestic emitters by different 
policy activities. Outputs normally consist of permits for new plants, clean- 
up orders for existing plants, control activities, sanctions and enforcement 
activities. The comparison of actual emitter behavior, elicited by means 
of interviews with the outputs, served as a basis to estimate the degree to  
which emitters were in compliance with regulations and orders in the dif- 
ferent LIAs. The net impact of environmental policy consists of those 
cases in which emitter behavior can be considered to be in full compliance 
with the related set of administrative outputs6. 
2.3. The independent variables 
The empirical analysis of the data from Layers 1 and 2 of the matrix 
of independent variables has served to explain the different types of out- 
put activities in terms of the interest position, the modes of behavior and 
the interaction of the participating actor groups in theprestructured policy 
implementation game. Interaction processes have been described with re- 
spect the to the number and constituency of participating actors, the 
characteristic features of the content of the output, the actual features 
of the administrative procedure and its duration, the coalitions among the 
actors, the possible involvement of national and regional actors and 
changes of the content during the implementation processes. On the basis 
of these data the extent to  which the outputs can be related to particular 
actors'interest was determined by examiningnot only the concrete pro- 
cedural influence variables assumed t o  be significant but also the variables 
of the administrative and political structure in terms of their interest sel- 
ectivity. Such administrative structures include routine procedures often 
legally formalized, administrative organization such as the distribution of 
competences, equipment, staffing, financial resources, the degree of auton- 
omy of different administrative units and their leeways of discretion. From 
this perspective, however, there remained a more orless significant portion 
that could only be explained in terms of implementation-relevant elements 
of the national administrative program as described under 3.5. below 
(Layer 3). Thus, already prestructured elements determining implemen- 
tation interaction processes became t he object of t he analysis of program- 
formulation-oriented interaction processes on the national level. Such 
processes, too, occur under particular structural constraints such as the 
distribution of competences amongst ministries, the involvement of other 
administrative units or the employment of external experts and commis- 
sions. These administrative organizational patterns can also be explained 
frequently in terms of the interest position of the main actors. 
According to the framework locational variables are considered as 
specific socio-cultural, socio-economic and political context dimensions 
within which environmental policy processes take place. These variables 
have an impact on program formulation and implementation activities; 
they influence the opportunities for action and the interest position of 
the various actors within the stable, basic patterns of societal power 
AS noted below (3.4.1.), under specific political-administrative cultures such as in the case 
of Switzerland, we can find compliance without any concrete individual policy output due 
t o  an involvement of emitters ina well-estalished interaction network between emitters and 
the related agency. In some other cases we find direct compliance with general regulations 
without individual outputs. 
I Implementation ot alr quality Improvement rrograms 
relationships set by the system-structural conditions. The following eight 
variables have been analyzed : 
When conceiving and analyzing these variables empirically over time, 
the research did not intend to explain ambient air quality changes or dif- 
ferent types of emitter behavior by immediately correlating them with 
each other. Rather, they served as secondary explanation dimensions sup- 
porting empirically evident constellations. Primarily, changes of the econ- 
omic situation and energy supply in the 1970 's gave some additional ex- 
planations for the relative influence of powerful actors going beyond the 
data gathered in connection with the intervening variables. 
Contrarily to liberal pluralistic theories of society, the project con- 
ceives the fundamental importance of the structuralprinciples of national 
characteristics of capitalism and political administrative culture for the 
patterns of social interaction. Inequality of life chances, differences in 
perceptions, opportunities for action and the way in which social factors 
assert themselves will be decisively conditioned by the principles of the 
economic structure and cultural traditions. Patterns of inequality will be 
systematically and persistently reinforced by certain rules of selectivity 
which tend to  function in support of specific capitalistic forms of societal 
organization. It has been assumed that there are systematic limits t o  
constraints on the effectiveness of policies trying to  improve environ- 
mental quality. These constraints are not always directly visible in concrete 
decision processes. They set very firm limits to  reform efforts, especially 
in those cases where these structures themselves are to be modified. The 
question "To what extent are political administrative systems able to 
achieve a balance between the functional requirements of the economic 
system and legitimatory demands under these structural constraints?" 
will always be difficult to  answer. Our limited analysis concentrated on 
data reported in existing literature on the following themes : power struc- 
tures; the distribution of property rights; the degree of social control in 
the field of investment decisions (especially as far as relevant environ- 
mental activities are concerned); characteristics of social control over state- 
owned industries (energy sector, other infrastructural supply); the impact 
of unions' participation and of consumers on the relevant decisions. In 
the field of administrative-political culture, the reports by national teams 
focus on those characteristics of interaction patterns between the political- 
administrative system and its environment (which are typical not only for 
(1) economic situation; 
(2) energy situation; 
(3) governmental finances; 
(4) ecological situation; 
(5) environmental consciousness; 
(6) technological development ; 
(7) level of environmental research; 
(8) international influence. 
the investigated policy area but typical for administrative activities of each 
country as a whole because of a common administrative political tradition). 
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2.4. The "intervening variables" 
Analyzing intervening variables prevents a "non liquet" ensuring 
that we know at least something about the determinants of emitter behav- 
iour if environmental policy outputs should not matter significantly. The 
following "other policy outputs" have been conceived as intervening 
variables : 
Peter Knoepfel 
- Energy policy : such outputs frequently consist of local or regional 
attempts to  save energy and are implemented either by subsidies or tax 
advantages or by special conditions within building permits (hooking up 
to a district heating system, energy-saving equipment, insulating houses, 
etc.); 
- Land use planning : only the Netherlands and Denmark have system- 
atically coupled air quality control policies with land use planning (environ- 
mental impact statements in designated special industrial zones). For the 
other countries, local zoning, regional land use planning, or  issuing building 
permits for industrial sites have been viewed as an intervening output 
either supporting or conflicting with environmental policy activities; 
- Regional economic policy: financial subsidies or  tax advantages 
can be granted to  firms if moving into particular regions and complying 
with certain environmental conditions. More frequently, however, re- 
gional development policies do not care about environmental concerns. 
This situation often leads to  conflictual policy outputs. 
Emitter behavior often depends on extra-governmental socio-econ- 
omic factors rather than on political-administrative activities. Such inter- 
vening variables often reflect changes in situational variables (such as econ- 
omic and energy situations) as well as environmental consciousness: 
- Market mechanisms : The development of energy prices, especially 
of electricity and natural gas, and their relative differences are likely to  
be responsible for emission-relevant changes of fuels. Utilizing "environ- 
mentally friendly" combustion technologies or  air pollution control de- 
vices reducing emission depends on whether such technologies are econ- 
omically feasible and profitable for the owner. Furthermore, industrial 
emissions often depend immediately on the degree of their productivity 
activities, which, in turn, depend on the economic trends. 
- Social control : Formal agencies' enforcement activities are often 
stimulated by public pressure. Emitters comply with permit conditions or 
clean-up orders because they are concerned about their reputation. This 
kind of social control depends on the level of environmental consciousness 
in the local population. There are cases where environmentalists and emit- 
ters came to  some "extra-governmental" contractual agreement regarding 
the regulation of local pollution problems. 
I Implementation of air quality improvement Programs 1 3. Basic Analytical Dimensions 
3. I .  Emitters - Emitter Behavior 
As emitter behavior is the secondary dependent variable indicating 
impact of air quality policies, the project does not consider emitters as 
simple actors but as acting and reacting targets of policy outputs. Except 
for the domestic sector, emitters are individual enterprises normally having 
strong relationships to the actor "industrial interest groups" being, by 
definition, involved in implementation and enforcement activities. Given 
their central role for implementation research, it was necessary first of all 
to  establish an inventory of emitters by means of a common classification7, 
enabling the definition of the main emitters, t o  calculate the development 
of their SO, emissions as well as to  typify the different patterns of inter- 
action between emitter categories and agencies. For each LIA a relatively 
reduced sample of large emitters was found, especially power plants, re- 
fineries, iron and steel plants, chemical plants or collective heating instal- 
lations, normally responsible for more than two thirds of the total SO, 
emissions. Emission-relevant behavior is indicated by the sulphur content 
of combusted fuels, the combustion technology and abatement equipment 
as well as height of stacks. By means of interviews with the most important 
emitters their behavior was described in terms of these three categories as 
well as their motives for changing or maintaining their emission activities. 
3.2. Theactors 
3.2.1. The eight actor classes 
The framework conceptualizes eight actor classes containing various 
actor groups acting under different labels depending on changing problem 
constellations and activity levels of the political system (local, regional, 
national). This conceptualization of actors implies at least loose, sometimes 
even partially conflictual, contacts between the different groups belonging 
to  the same actor class because of the existence of a common interest 
rooted in their association with the same subsystem of society. The frame- 
work conceptualizes the following actor classes : ( I )  the environmental 
policy administration; (2) administrative units from other policy areas; 
(3)  parliamentary bodies; (4) courts; (5) economic interest groups; ( 6 )  in- 
dividuals affected by pollution and environmentalist organizations; (7) 
the scientific community; (8) political parties. 
3.2.2. Analysis of the empirical actors 
Using a heuristic model which reveals affected interests, the national 
teams went through all available lists of existing interest organizations in 
order to  establish a comprehensive table o f  all potential actors in the field 
7The classification contains the following groups: (1) coal-fired power plants; (2) oil-fired 
power plants; (3) refineries; (4) iron and steel plants; (5) chemical plants; (6) other large 
emitters; (7) commercial industrial plants with high energy consumption; (8) commerciaI 
industrial plants of medium size; (9) small commercial enterprises; (10) domestic heating 
installations; (1 1) transportation. 
of SO, air quality control policies according to  the eight-class typology. 
This way of starting the actor analysis has been very useful: firstly, it 
enabled us to find out the basic network of interest groups behind concrete 
policy processes and their investigation, bringing also up those actors play- 
ing a hidden role in prestructuring and organizing interventions by interests 
groups without appearing in concrete policy processes. Secondly, such net- 
works turned out to  play equifunctionalroles in policy processes, especially 
by developing their own control programs, standards and other guidelines 
implemented by autonomous activities of the participants8. Another ad- 
vantage of this table was the idenfication of those actorsactually involved 
in policy processes. By using this network some unforeseeable actors can 
be detected as "grey eminences" which have not been discovered only by 
looking at documents describing concrete policy processes under investi- 
gation. 
Futhermore, the comparison of potentially and actually involved 
actors served as an empirical basis t o  determine some selectivity patterns 
within policy processes. 
In order to prepare the analysis of program formulation and im- 
plementation processes and to evaluate their relative power, the main actor 
groups have been analyzed in detail. The common framework especially 
stressed their internal structure ,and main activities; their external struc- 
tures, such as coalition partners and memberships in governmental policy 
bodies, as well as their strategies in program formulation and implemen- 
tation processes. Although primarily established for the explanation of 
actor constellations in SO, air quality control policies, this analysis has 
revealed some interesting aspects of the structure of interest representation 
in environmental politics. Therefore, it can also be applied to  make anti- 
cipatory statements on the reaction of actors to  new policies in other 
environmental areas. 
3.2.3. Analyzing Environmental Agencies 
The scope of comprehensive empirical analysis of the core actor, the 
"environmental agency", was the definition of its degree ofautonomy and 
discretion, its problem solving capacity and its basic strategical orientations 
over time. The degree of autonomy of the agency within a broader arrange- 
ment of different administrative units has been shown to depend on the 
formal hierarchical structure, normally only mobilized in conflictual cases, 
and on the relative power of an agency and its constituency within the 
institutional arrangement. In dealing with everyday issues, the autonomy 
of an agency is normally very high. Concerning the regional and local auth- 
orities leeway of discretion with reference to  national supervisory agencies, 
the national research teams have established precise analyses of both the 
quantity and quality of "agency-oriented outputs". Problem perception 
8Private standard setting institutions can be found in Italy (ENEL for stack height formulas 
for power plants), France (CITEPA for monitoring and AFNOR), West Germany (Verein 
Deutscher Ingenieure - VDI for special air quality standards and stack height formulas) as 
well as Switzerland (fire insurances for domestic heating installations). 
and problem solving capacity have been assumed to  depend on the pro- 
fessional training of officials (technical vs. administrative skill), different 
career patterns, personnel and financial resources and the existence of 
analytical capacities of laboratories. In order to  assess the problem solving 
capacity in a comparative way, the framework proposes to  create an indi- 
cator called "administrative sensitivity". This indicator is established by 
analyzing the national budget over a ten-year period in order to  estimate 
the percentage of environmental protection expenses within the whole 
budget and to  define the percentage of expenses for air quality control 
such as research, intrumental equipment, financial means, and staffing. 
The increase of these costs has been related to  the increase of SO, emissions 
within the country over time. In order to  compare problem solving 
capacity among implementation agencies we established a similar index 
for "implementation sensitivity" within the LIAs under investigation 
taking into account the costs for staffing regional agencies, funds trans- 
ferred from the national level for specific tasks, investments for research 
activities, and the costs for the creation of monitoring networks. The 
crucial comparative question was whether one could find at least a loose 
correlation between different levels of administration and related ambient 
air quality or  emission trends amongst LIAs and countries. 
On the basis of our comprehension output analysis and additional 
interviews with agencies the research tried to  find different profiles of the 
basic strategical orientations of agencies (Dente, Knoepfel & Weidner, 
1982). The agencies are typified along the following dimensions : case-by- 
case intervention vs. systematical selectivity in controlling emitters and 
giving clean-up orders; highly formalized intervening procedures vs. infor- 
mal interaction processes; emission orientation vs. ambient-air-quality- 
oriented interventions. This topology will serve as the basis for the devel- 
opment of different types of administrative rationalities within air quality 
control policies amongst regions and countries. 
3.3. The outputs 
3.3.1. Overview 
The framework distinguishes three types of outputs: 
- emitter-oriented outputs consisting of permits for individual plants 
clean-up orders, monitoring/inspection processes and enforcement 
activities; 
- agency-oriented outputs consisting of specific guidelines from 
supervisory agencies for regional and/or local agencies; 
- administrative programs containing decisions on objectives, strat- 
egies, different types of standards, monitoring systems, financial, organ- 
izational and procedural decisions regarding implementation processes. 
A precise quantitative analysis of the agency implementation outputs 
within the different LIAs brought up a handy comparative indicator for 
the agencies' activity level and its changes over time to  be compared with 
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indicators of problem pressure. Moreover, the distribution of clean-up or- 
ders, inspections and enforcement activities amongst different emitter 
groups allowed to  define some patterns of space or branch specific selec- 
tivity. A qualitative analysis led to  different types of interest recognition 
patterns within interaction processes in which outputs are produced. 
3.3.2. Emitter-oriented outputs 
These outputs have been quantitatively documented by output inven- 
tories established for each LIA. They show the total number of outputs 
and their distribution over the ten-year period for each output category 
(permits, clean-up orders, inspections, enforcement activities) per emitter 
group and agency. A cross-regional and/or cross-national comparison of 
these inventories has to  consider the fact that there are implementation 
activities of agencies not leading to formal outputs although having a 
probable impact on emitter behavior. According to characteristics of the 
political-administrative culture within a region or a country, agencies pre- 
ferring informal bargaining processes with emitters within a well-estab- 
lished, almost instutionalized, interaction network can be found. In such 
cases the creation and maintenance of that network may be perceived as 
one of the predominant activities of the agency. The qualititative analysis 
of the outputs by means of a standardized form documented the control 
dimensions in the content of outputs, the formal and actual procedure of 
output generation, the different actor groups involved in specific steps of 
bargaining processes during the output generation, reasons, forms, fre- 
quency, intensity and consequences of their involvement. These dimen- 
sions are considered to  be important for the reconstruction of different 
interaction patterns within different types of bargaining processes (Hanf, 
198 1). The analysis paid special attention to the participants (bilateral, 
multilateral) and informal preconsultation procedures leading to an agree- 
ment between agency and emitter likely to  object to arguments brought 
up by environmentalist movements during subsequent public hearings. 
3.3.3. Agency-oriented Outputs 
Formal possibilities for the intervention of central authorities in 
concrete cases will depend on the broader constitutional arrangements 
of the country in question. The actual central/local relationship will de- 
pend on a number of political factors characterizing the case in question 
and its political importance. The range of such interaction patterns covers 
a continuum between a central government's jurisdiction and the regulat- 
ory activities of regional agencies without any involvement on the part 
of the central authority. Between these poles one can distinguish different 
forms of interaction according to the degree of the central agency's in- 
volvement and the source of initiative for the intervention. 
Actualagency-oriented outputs intend to influence the overall con- 
text such as structures, processes, resources, etc., within which local or re- 
gional environmental policy implementation agencies operate. They con- 
tain realizations related to  national regulations, supervisory and coordi- 
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native activities as well as allocational decisions (staffing, training of per- 
sonnel, monitoring equipment, etc.). Contrary t o  agency-oriented outputs 
actual agency-oriented activities do not intend in any way to intervene in 
individual cases. They may be selectively setting priorities for specific 
problem areas which discriminate against regions considered less prob- 
lematic. 
3.4. Administrative Programs 
3.4.1. Notion of "Program" 
Contrary to  other projects (e.g. Krupnick & Harrington, 198 l ) ,  the 
framework of the presented study uses a broad definition of the term 
"program" (Knoepfel & Weidner, 1982). This definition is more realistic 
insofar as economic interest groups and parliamentary bodies in program 
formulation processes are often conscious of that broader notion : such 
an ensemble of different program elements may prestructure the implemen- 
tation game to  a much higher extent than traditional implementation pol- 
icy analysts are supposed to assume. The concept of program contains the 
following elements : 
( 1  ) Basic principles : The extent of the "polluter-pays-principle", 
selection and extent of regulatory instruments, the degree of centraliz- 
ation/decentralization and standardization of regulation and the decision 
on an immission or emission orientation of control strategies. 
( 2 )  Concrete policy objectives : Stabilization of emissions or ambient 
air quality, their decrease or the control of their increasement rates 
(Knoepfel & Weidner, 1980). 
(3) Strategy selection : The framework distinguishes fourteen air 
quality control strategies with respect to stationary emission sources using 
the following criteria : immission vs. emission orientation and the objective 
of regulations (sulphur content; combustion and abatement technology ; 
transmission) (Knoepfel & Weidner & Hanf, 1980). 
(4) Ambient  air quality standards : These are the main operational 
and evaluable control dimensions for the effectiveness of strategies and 
implementation activities. 
( 5 )  Measurement methods : Regulations on methods, data reporting 
as well as the installation of monitoring networks necessary for a reason- 
able implementation of the ambient air quality standards. 
( 6 )  Emission standards : Description of the maximal acceptable 
amount of discharged air pollutants with different methods (percentage, 
total amount). 
( 7 )  Process standards : They fix some minimal combustion or abate- 
ment equipment standards such as flue gas desulphurization equipment 
or  the so-called "fluidized bed furnances". 
( 8 )  Organizational and financial arrangements : These elements pre- 
determine the arrangement of implementation agencies, their jurisdiction 
and financial equipment as a precondition for any implementation of the 
program. 
( 9 )  Administrative instruments arzd procedures : Such regulations 
prestructure the degree of public involvement in implementation processes 
or the standing to sue against implementation agencies. 
3.4.2. Programming implementation struggles - five typical strategies : 
Given the fact that all these program elements collectively constitute 
the program and that changing one element means changing the program 
as a whole, the framework assumed that strategically skilled interest or- 
ganizations would try to  weaken programs by covertly building a pro- 
polluter bias into the rules of the implementation game without offending 
substantial program elements : They prefer to  maintain a pro-environmen- 
talist facade looking at the same time for possibilities to  kill the program 
by objecting special technical issues with a rather hidden political content 
(Knoepfel & Weidner, 1982). Such strategies may be of the following 
types : 
(1 ) Ensuring favorable monitoring data : It is possible to manipulate 
ambient air quality measurements by modifing the arrangements of single 
monitoring stations, of the percentage or time scale of standards or of 
the type of the chemical measurement methods. 
(2) "Democratization" : The "democrats" argue that there should 
be a broader paticipation of local authorities in formulating principles for 
"their own" ambient air quality by using a case-by-case regulatory ap- 
proach. Especially middle-range industry often favors this strategy arguing 
that those immediately affected by pollution and local authorities can 
appreciate the situation better. With this superficially "democratic" and 
"participatory" argumentation they cover their knowledge about their 
members' stronger position in bargaining with local authorities (Ullmann, 
1981). 
( 3 )  Organizational arrangements: Political scientists know that or- 
ganizational arrangements can enormously shape the outputs of implemen- 
tation processes (Bardach, 1977). In this field, the knowledge and experi- 
ence of economic interest groups canbe very high : having the best empiri- 
cal experience amongst their members with the existing set of possible 
regional and/or local agencies able to  cope with the program's implemen- 
tation, these organizations happen to  propose organizational arrangements 
favoring their concerns. Hence, the arguments for one or another agency 
will always be quite "rational". 
( 4 )  Financial arrangements: By voting against financial means for 
qualified staff of the implementation agencies or  the construction of a 
reliable monitoring network in parliament, it is both possible to  agree 
with strong standards on the one hand and to  considerably weaken the 
implementation activities on the other. 
(5) Procedural arrangements : In this field economic interest groups 
also seem to  be the best political scientists: although public involvement 
in implementation processes as such has become a commonly accepted 
principle (Weidner & Knoepfel, 1981) there still remains a lot of 
alternative ways of shaping concrete implementation processes more or 
less favorable to  emitters' positions. For industrial plants in Italy, for 
instance, a procedural arrangement is so complicated that control activities 
hardly lead to  any enforcement activity (Dente, Knoepfel & Weidner, 
1982). 
4. Conclusions 
How can the results of the empirical research be evaluated? The com- 
parative method of this project allows a comparison of the different LIAs 
and RISs and of the various countries under investigation, which uncovers 
evidence of positive and negative impacts of policy: emitter behavior may 
have been influenced in line with the national policy objectives or remain 
far from these programmatical statements. Such relative variations in im- 
plementation activities and impacts can, of course, already be built into 
the national and /or regional control program setting specific priorities. 
However, where the program, suggests that all local administrative areas 
were to  be treated equally, the research has tried to  assess to  what extent 
such differences in the implementation processes can be explained as the 
result of a too weak program structure of the varying activities on the part 
of the actor groups in the particular implementation areas, of varying 
administrative structures or  of a conscious stragegy pursued by the re- 
gional authority deliberately deviating from the national program. Usually 
such discrepancies between national program and regional implementation 
impacts are labelled as "implementation deficits" (Mayntz et al., 1978). 
Even if using our broader definition of program we might find such defi- 
cits, although to  a far more reduced extent. However, the notion of im- 
plementation deficit might be considered misleading because it suggests 
fautly or even illegal behavior of implementation agencies. Although there 
might be situations where this is the case, the bulk of implementation dif- 
ficulties is likely to  be caused by situations beyond individual responsi- 
bilities of agencies' civil servants. 
In the case of positive o r  negative impacts an attempt has been 
made to  establish which of the independent variables and actors activities 
on the implementation and program formulation levels in particular ac- 
count for these impacts. The study will lead to  a set of conclusions indica- 
ting which changes in specific procedures, organizational arrangements 
and program structures would be required under certain situational and 
system-structural conditions in order to  strengthen environmental 
concerns in air quality control policies likely to bring about an emitter 
behavior with a more positive impact on the environment. 
The presented framework has been developed for the particular pur- 
pose of analyzing policies in the field of SO, air quality control. During 
the fieldwork it proved to  be realistic and operational for empirical social 
science research. Its discussion with policy analysis projects in other areas 
suggests that at least the following conceptual elements might be gener- 
alizable and useful for policy analysis research as a whole : the comparative 
approach either for regional implementation areas within one country or 
for cross-national projects; the bottom-up-approach beginning with im- 
plementation analysis and climbing - layer by layer - towards program 
formulation processes; the inclusion of a comprehensively analyzed im- 
pact dimension; the categorization and individual analysis of different 
types of policy outputs and the related interaction processes; the broad 
definition of the term "program" encompassing both substantial and 
organizational programmatic elements; the proposed method to establish 
the actors analysis; the inclusion of a policy-related set of situative and 
socio-structural variables into the analysis. Whoever objects that the pre- 
sented program for policy analysis is too complex to be implemented may 
be reminded of the fact that political-administrative realities of today are 
much more complex than in the nineteenth century when their basic prin- 
ciples were developed. 
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